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ABSTRACT. If the resources used to wage wars could be spent elsewhere and save
more lives, does this mean that wars are unjustified? This article considers this
question, which has been largely overlooked by Just War Theorists and pacifists. It
focuses on whether the opportunity costs of war lead to a form of pacifism, which
it calls ‘Opportunity Costs Pacifism’. The article argues that Opportunity Costs
Pacifism is, at the more ideal level, compelling. It suggests that the only plausible
response to Opportunity Costs Pacifism applies in highly nonideal circumstances.
This has major implications for Just War Theory and pacifism since it is only at the
highly nonideal level that war can be justified.
I. INTRODUCTION
In addition to the destruction and devastation caused by the War on
Terror and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, they have been esti-
mated to have cost the U.S. $5.9 trillion.1 This money could con-
ceivably have been used instead to reduce significantly the deaths
from preventable diseases globally, potentially saving millions of
lives. Does this mean that these wars were wrong, independent of
the other reasons for and against them? More generally, if the re-
sources used to wage war could be spent elsewhere and save more
lives, does this mean that war is impermissible?
1 Neta Crawford, ‘United States Budgetary Costs of the Post-9/11 Wars Through FY2019: $5.9
Trillion Spent and Obligated’, Costs of War Project, November 2018.
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In large part, this issue has been ignored by pacifists and Just War
Theorists. Pacifists focus on the critique of war and, in doing so,
largely overlook that the resources spent on war could potentially be
put to better use.2 Similarly, Just War Theorists, for the most part,
do not consider opportunity costs. Of those that do consider them,
some have claimed that they are outside the domain of Just War
Theory.3 A handful of Just War Theorists have recently repudiated
these claims, persuasively arguing that Just War Theory should
consider opportunity costs.4 As I discuss below, these accounts,
however, tend to underplay the significance of the objection to war
that arises from considering opportunity costs. Crucially, they also
do not tackle head-on the central issue: do opportunity costs render
war impermissible and so lead us to pacifism?
In what follows, I consider whether they do. I explore what I call
‘Opportunity Costs Pacifism’, which holds that opportunity costs
render all wars impermissible. I first outline the objection to war
provided by opportunity costs and how it relates both to the other
central criticisms of war presented by pacifism and to Opportunity
Costs Pacifism. I then consider the accounts of opportunity costs
offered in Just War Theory, before turning to two responses to
Opportunity Costs Pacifism, which I argue fail. I go on to argue that
there is a more plausible response to Opportunity Costs Pacifism,
but that this applies only in highly nonideal circumstances. This has,
2 See, for instance, Iain Atack, Nonviolence in Political Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2012); Duane L. Cady, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, Second Edition (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 2010); Andrew Fiala, Practical Pacifism (New York: Algora, 2004); Robert L.
Holmes, On War and Morality (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); Robert L. Holmes,
Pacifism: A Philosophy of Nonviolence (London: Bloomsbury, 2016); Larry May, Contingent Pacifism:
Revisiting Just War Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). As far as I am aware, there
are no accounts of pacifism that explore the issue of opportunity costs in detail. To be sure, opportunity
costs are sometimes noted by pacifists as a reason to oppose war, but this is often fleeting.
3 See, for instance, Thomas Hurka, ‘Proportionality and Necessity’, in Larry May (ed.), War: Essays
in Political Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 127–144, at p. 134.
4 Jeff McMahan, ‘Proportionate Defense’, Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 21 (2013–2014): pp.
1–36, at 2–6; Kieran Oberman, ‘War and Poverty’, Philosophical Studies 176 (2019): pp. 197–217; Victor
Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011), pp. 338–345; Victor Tadros, ‘Unjust Wars Worth Fighting For’, Journal of Practical Ethics 4 (2016):
pp. 52–78, at pp. 72–76. Opportunity costs are also briefly noted by Robin Dunford and Michael Neu,
‘The Responsibility to Protect in a World of Already Existing Intervention’, European Journal of Inter-
national Relations 25 (2019): pp. 1080–1102, at pp. 1087–1089; Christopher Finlay, Is Just War Possible?
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), pp. 62–63; Uwe Steinhoff, ‘Is There a Duty to Militarily Intervene to
Stop a Genocide?’, in Christian Neuhäuser and Christoph Schuck (eds.), Military Interventions: Consid-
erations from Philosophy and Political Science (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2017), pp. 59–80; and Benjamin A.
Valentino, ‘The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention: The Hard Truth about a Noble Notion’,
Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2011: pp. 60–73.
JAMES PATTISON546
I conclude, major implications for Just War Theory and pacifism: it is
only at the highly nonideal level that war can be potentially per-
missible.
Two clarifications are necessary. First, Opportunity Costs Paci-
fism is concerned with war, defined as violent armed conflict
involving at least 1,000 battlefield deaths.5 It does not necessarily hold
that the use of force short of war is impermissible. Several of the
arguments in favour of Opportunity Costs Pacifism may also apply
to the use of force short of war, but making the case against the use
of force short of war is beyond the scope of this article, given the
variety of measures that this encompasses (e.g. drone strikes, assas-
sinations, and no-fly zones).
Second, for reasons of space, I focus on international threats ra-
ther than purely domestic ones. By ‘international threats’, I mean
threats posed to the state by another entity from beyond its borders
or threats posed to others beyond its borders. This means that
Opportunity Costs Pacifism is focused on claiming that international
wars are wrong. It does not claim that civil wars are impermissible.
Again, it might be extended to this, but this is also beyond the scope
of this article, given that civil wars raise additional ethical issues to
international wars, such about the rights of non-state actors to wage
war and the tactics guerrillas may permissibly adopt.6
II. OPPORTUNITY COSTS PACIFISM
To start with, it helps to distinguish between the objection to war
from opportunity costs – what we can call the ‘Opportunity Costs
Objection’ – and the form of pacifism – Opportunity Costs Pacifism.
The Opportunity Costs Objection holds, in short, that war is highly
problematic because the resources spent on it could be better spent
elsewhere, such as by tackling other crises. Opportunity Costs
Pacifism holds that the Opportunity Costs Objection is so serious
that it takes us to pacifism. In this section, I will first explicate the
5 This follows the influential and widely adopted definition of war given by the Correlates of War
project. See Kristian Gleditsch, ‘A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816-
2002)’, International Interactions 30 (2004): pp. 231–262.
6 On these issues, see the seminal treatments by Christopher Finlay, Terrorism and the Right to Resist:
A Theory of Just Revolutionary War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) and Michael Gross,
The Ethics of Insurgency: A Critical Guide to Just Guerrilla Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2015).
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Opportunity Costs Objection before considering how it may lead to
Opportunity Costs Pacifism.
A. The Opportunity Costs Objection
There are two central elements to the Opportunity Costs Objection.
The first compares threats. This is assessed according to what I call
below ‘threat-specific considerations’ – the morally relevant features
of the threats. Rather than simply assuming that wars tend to tackle
the worst situations, we should, the objection runs, look to the
magnitude of the threat at stake, judged in terms of the likely impact
on individuals’ basic interests. When we do so, the objection con-
tinues, there is a huge difference in the magnitude of the threat
between war and the other situations that might be tackled instead.
Most significantly, communicable and non-communicable diseases
threaten far more individuals than the sorts of threats that war might
be thought permissible in response to – i.e. terrorism, mass atroci-
ties, and national and collective self-defence. According to the World
Health Organization (WHO), the main cause of death globally is
ischaemic heart disease (16.6% of all deaths), followed by stroke
(10.2%), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (5.3%), and lower
respiratory infections (5.2%).7 Moreover, many of these deaths are
caused by easily preventable diseases, such as measles (which can be
relatively cheaply vaccinated against) and malaria (which mosquito
nets can prevent).8 Violence only amounts to 2.6% of the annual
global death toll. According to the Opportunity Costs Objection,
then, if international actors such as states are to take seriously the
need to focus on the threats of the largest magnitudes, prioritising
violent conflicts is unlikely to be permissible.
The second element of the Opportunity Costs Objection concerns
the justifiability of the measure compared to other measures. This is as-
sessed according to what I call below ‘measure-specific considera-
7 World Health Organization (WHO), Global Health Estimates 2016 Summary Tables: Causes of Death,
2000–2016). Available at <https://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/GHE2016_
Deaths_Global_2000_2016.xls?ua=1>. Also see Causes of Death Collaborators, ‘Global, Regional,
and National Age-sex-specific Mortality for 282 Causes of Death in 195 Countries and Territories, 1980–
2017: A Systematic Analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2017’, The Lancet, 392 (2018): pp.
1736–1788.
8 Valentino, ‘The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention’ p. 69. The COVID-19 pandemic (which,
at the time of writing, is developing) is likely to affect these figures, rendering violence an even smaller
proportion of the overall annual death toll.
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tions’ – the morally relevant features of the measure to be adopted.
This is a factor, most clearly, of the effectiveness of the response.
The Opportunity Costs Objection here is straightforward: many
violent conflicts are intractable and military action will often achieve
at best only relatively small improvements compared to other forms
of action. For instance, even if war saves thousands of lives, this pales
into insignificance compared to the millions of lives that could be
saved by health interventions. Indeed, the objection runs,
notable health interventions with regard to diarrhoea, malaria,
smallpox, and other forms of immunisation have each saved more
lives than if world peace had been secured, with at least 2.5 million
deaths per year for each of these four interventions.9 Moreover, the
objection continues, states should look to where other actors are not
acting.10 They can expect that many states will focus on the inten-
tional violations of basic human rights, given the visceral reaction to
them. There is the opportunity to have greater impact where the
threat is still serious but receives relatively far less attention, par-
ticularly where the victims are underprivileged. This might range
from threats to mental health in developing countries to antimi-
crobial resistance for diseases such as tuberculosis.11
It may seem, though, that it is more important to tackle violence
in order to promote stability and order, and therefore to reduce
poverty and disease in the long term. Indeed, tackling mass atrocities
may sometimes play an important role in addressing other issues,
such as gender inequality and global poverty, to the extent that
security is necessary for development. However, this does not nec-
essarily undermine the Opportunity Costs Objection. This is because
poverty can also lead to conflict and so the best way of preventing
violence may often be to tackle non-violent harms.12 In addition,
communicable and non-communicable diseases kill in many
9 Toby Ord, ‘The Moral Imperative Toward Cost-effectiveness in Global Health’, Center for Global
Development, March 2013, p. 4; Jenifer Ehreth, ‘The Global Value of Vaccination’, Vaccine 21 (2003):
pp. 596–600.
10 This is also a major line of argument from effective altruists. See William MacAskill on ‘ne-
glectedness’, Doing Good Better: How Effective Altruism Can Help You Make a Difference (London: Guardian
Faber Publishing, 2015).
11 World Health Organization, Antibacterial Agents in Clinical Development: An Analysis of the
Antibacterial Clinical Development Pipeline, Including Tuberculosis, September 2017. Available at <http://
apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/258965/1/WHO-EMP-IAU-2017.11-eng.pdf>.
12 Alex Braithwaite, Niheer Dasandi, and David Hudson, ‘Does Poverty Cause Conflict? Isolating the
Causal Origins of the Conflict Trap’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 33 (2016): pp. 45–66.
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stable states and, as noted above, success in tackling conflicts is
extremely difficult and so it may be better to tackle the cases where
there is no conflict. Furthermore, even if one still holds that
addressing violence should be prioritised, this does not mean that
violence against others should be the focus. The biggest violent killer
is self-harm (793,000 deaths in 2016).13 This might mean that far
more lives could be saved by investing in global mental health than
by any other response to violence. Important here is that there is a
sizable global ‘treatment gap’; more than 75% of those identified
with serious anxiety, mood, impulse control, or substance use dis-
orders in low and middle-income countries receive no care at all,
with the treatment gap for schizophrenia and other psychoses in sub-
Saharan Africa exceeding 90%.14 Even if one still holds that violence
against others should be prioritised, interpersonal violence is a far
larger killer than what the WHO calls ‘collective violence and
international intervention’ – the sorts of situations that war is typi-
cally launched in response to (477,000 deaths compared to 184,000
deaths in 2016).15 It follows that, on the Opportunity Costs Objec-
tion, there should be much greater investment in domestic disar-
mament, in improving gender equality and campaigns against
domestic violence, and in ensuring proper accountability for inter-
personal violence.
To be sure, the Opportunity Costs Objection is not necessarily
consequentialist. In what I think is its most plausible form, it includes
deontological considerations in the assessment of the measures (i.e.
as ‘measure-specific considerations’) and these also point to avoiding
war. Most clearly, violent responses to violence will often do harm to
innocents. This falls foul of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing in
moral philosophy, whereby it is widely held that it is worse to do
harm than it is to allow it.16 By contrast, non-violent interventions,
13 WHO, Global Health Estimates.
14 Vikram Patel and Martin Prince, ‘Global Mental Health: A New Global Health Field Comes of
Age’, JAMA 303 (2010): pp. 1976–1977. Moreover, mental, neurological and substance-use disorders
constitute 13% of the global burden of disease (surpassing both cardiovascular disease and cancer), with
depression as the third-leading contributor to the global disease burden. Pamela Y. Collins, Vikram
Patel, Sarah S. Joestl, et al. ‘Grand Challenges in Global Mental Health’, Nature 475 (2011): pp. 27–30.
15 WHO, Global Health Estimates.
16 Samuel Scheffler, ‘Doing and Allowing’, Ethics 114 (2004): pp. 215–239; Fiona Woollard, ‘The
Doctrine of Doing and Allowing I: Analysis of the Doing/Allowing Distinction’, Philosophy Compass 7
(2012): pp. 448–458; Fiona Woollard, ‘The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing II: The Moral Relevance of
the Doing/Allowing Distinction’, Philosophy Compass 7 (2012): pp. 459–469.
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particularly in global health, can be highly successful and do far less
harm. To that extent, the Opportunity Costs Objection concerns
negative duties not to harm. That is, other threats should be tackled
to avoid doing harm.
In addition, and perhaps more obviously, the Opportunity Costs
Objection concerns positive duties to assist. That is, other threats
should be tackled to help save more lives. It is worth noting here that
virtually all mainstream accounts of international ethics, including
those of renowned non-cosmopolitans, accept that states have pos-
itive, humanitarian duties beyond their borders.17 Yet, few (if any)
states currently fulfil these duties sufficiently. For instance, very few
meet the very low target of giving 0.7% of their GDP to foreign aid;
some of those that do, such as the UK, direct this aid politically,
rather than directing it to those most in need.18 It follows that it is
unlikely that states could invoke having done enough already to fulfil
their humanitarian duties in order to overcome the Opportunity
Costs Objection.
Nor does it seem that states could plausibly claim that they have
tackled all threats and so avoid the Opportunity Costs Objection.
The objection is likely to continue to arise because those beyond the
state’s borders are almost always at some risk of peril. This is because,
for the foreseeable future, there will be risks of varying degrees,
which cannot be fully eradicated. This is because, more straight-
forwardly, it seems likely that the resources that publics are willing
to support spending on international matters will continue to be
limited and so governments will need to prioritise which goals they
pursue. It is also because, more fundamentally, the opportunity costs
at stake are best understood not as concerning actual harms, but
rather threats with varying probabilities of materialising as harm.
Some threats of harm will be highly probable, such as climate
change-induced global poverty, but others far less so, but still very
serious, such as existential risks to the whole of humanity (e.g. a
nuclear annihilation and a super-volcanic eruption). It is not possible
for states to tackle fully all risks, so that everyone is fully protected.
17 See, for instance, David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007); Thomas Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 33 (2005): pp.
113–147.
18 Ben Quinn, ‘UK Among Six Countries to Hit 0.7% UN Aid Spending Target’, The Guardian, 4 Jan
2017.
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They are always going to be subject to some existential risk of harm,
however small. To that extent, opportunity costs are ubiquitous.
B. Opportunity Costs Pacifism
Having outlined the Opportunity Costs Objection, let’s now turn to
Opportunity Costs Pacifism. This holds that the Opportunity Costs
Objection is so serious that wars are impermissible. The reasoning is
this: given how poorly wars are likely to fare once opportunity costs
are taken into account, pacifism – and, specifically, Opportunity
Costs Pacifism – seems to be the correct view. States should ideally
use their resources on non-military measures to tackle the most
serious threats. So many die from preventable diseases and in other
situations that spending resources on wars that save only a few and
do harm is frivolous. It is hard, the reasoning goes, to identify a
feasible war, particularly on a large scale, that could be permissible
once opportunity costs have been taken into account. It would most
likely have to save hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of lives.
There does not currently seem to be a threat of sufficient seriousness
that war could potentially address and, even if there were, it is
unlikely that war would be sufficiently efficacious. After all, World
War II – the standard example used against pacifism – was over 70
years ago and it is very unlikely that there will be a similar threat that
could be tackled soon. Thus, the argument runs, it seems that the
Opportunity Costs Objection takes us to Opportunity Costs Paci-
fism.
To understand this claim further, it helps to consider how
Opportunity Costs Pacifism relates to pacifism and to other pacifist
critiques. Although pacifists share a general opposition to war, they
vary in how strong this opposition is. On the one hand, on what we
can call ‘soft pacifism’, the rejection of war is weaker. On this view,
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militarism is problematic and war is generally wrong and should be
avoided, yet occasional wars can still be permissible.19 By contrast,
on what we can call ‘hard pacifism’, the rejection of war is more
robust. There are no exceptions – war is impermissible.
One type of hard pacifism is absolute pacifism: all wars are always
impermissible. Another type of hard pacifism is contingent (hard)
pacifism: all wars are currently impermissible – and will be so for the
foreseeable future. On this view, as John Rawls notes, ‘‘the possi-
bility of a just war is conceded but not under present circum-
stances’’.20 Applying this to opportunity costs, (hard) contingent
Opportunity Costs Pacifism holds that it is conceivable that war
might be permissible because of the opportunity costs, but this is not
reasonably foreseeable in current circumstances or in the near future.
It does not claim, though, that war will always be impermissible.
There might be circumstances in the past where war was permissible
or far into the future where war is permissible (or even in the near
future, but not currently reasonably foreseeable). To that extent, it is
still somewhat tentative.
This (hard) contingent pacifism is the form of Opportunity Costs
Pacifism that I will focus on. This is because, first, it is unclear
whether the soft rejection of war is any different to dovish forms of
Just War Theory. As such, what is most interesting and significant
about pacifism – the outright rejection of war as a policy option – is
not present. Second, (hard) absolute pacifism seems too vehement. It
seems plausible that wars in the past were permissible (e.g. World
War II) and it is at least conceivable that, in the distant future, there
might be an international system where war is the best option, such
as if cheap technology allows for highly precise targeting of only
those who are fully culpable, with no collateral damage.
19 Fiala, Practical Pacifism; Andrew Fiala, ‘Practical Pacifism, Jus in Bello, and Citizen Responsibility:
The Case of Iraq’, Ethical Perspectives: Journal of the European Ethics Network 13 (2006): pp. 673–697. In a
similar vein, Andrew Alexandra presents his approach as ‘political pacifism’ that rejects the ‘institution
of war’ but appears to view some wars as still permissible. Andrew Alexandra, ‘Liability, War, and
Peace’, Philosophical Forum 46 (2015): pp. 41–53, at p. 42; Andrew Alexandra, ‘Political Pacifism’, Social
Theory and Practice 29 (2003): pp. 589–606. See, further, James Pattison, The Alternatives to War: From
Sanctions to Nonviolence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 216–220; Cheyney Ryan, ‘Paci-
fism(s)’, Philosophical Forum 46 (2015): pp. 17–39; Cheyney Ryan, ‘Pacifism’, in Seth Lazar and Helen
Frowe (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 277–293.
20 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 335.
For a more detailed exploration of contingent pacifism, see Saba Bazargan, ‘Varieties of Contingent
Pacifism in War’, in Helen Frowe and Gerard Lang (eds), How We Fight (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014), pp. 1–17 and May, Contingent Pacifism.
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The two central reasons in favour of pacifism highlighted by
pacifists concern the (1) instrumentalist and (2) the deontological
critique of war.21 The instrumentalist claim is that, by killing non-
combatants, destroying infrastructure, harming international order,
and promoting violence, wars have huge negative consequences.22
The benefits that war might bring, such as in terms of saving lives
with humanitarian intervention or defending sovereignty, do not
outweigh these harms. The deontological critique is that wars do
harm in that they involve killing soldiers and civilians, and thereby
fall foul of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing in moral philosophy,
which is sometimes framed by pacifists in terms of the difference
between killing and letting die.23
In addition to these central pacifist arguments, which rely on the
critique of war, there is an oft-overlooked, third central reason in
favour of pacifism. This is a positive reason in favour of the alter-
natives to war, such as targeted sanctions, diplomatic measures,
positive incentives, criminal tribunals, humanitarian assistance, and
accepting refugees. These options are often more effective than
appreciated and have other reasons in their favour. For instance,
certain diplomatic measures (e.g. naming and shaming) can con-
tribute to morally important global norms and other measures, such
as economic sanctions and arms embargoes, can distribute costs
more fairly.24 In short, then, war is wrong because (3) the alterna-
tives are typically better.
However, it might be replied that these three points do not lead
to pacifism on their own. For instance, it might be claimed (to be
clear, I take no stance) that, when judged in isolation, certain recent
wars were all-things-considered permissible, such as the First Gulf
War in 1991 and the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999, to
the extent that they brought about good consequences and there
were not any clear feasible alternatives. In addition, it seems that the
21 There are other arguments presented by pacifists; I focus on those that seem most telling.
22 Laurie Calhoun, ‘How Violence Breeds Violence: Some Utilitarian Considerations’, Politics 22
(2002): pp. 95–108.
23 Holmes, On War and Morality, pp. 203–211. This critique is also sometimes framed in terms of the
wrongfulness of intentionally harming the innocent. Although I cannot pursue this here, it seems to me
that the wrong at stake is in fact largely about doing harm to innocents, since the harms are often only
collateral and, even when intended, may still be motivated by good reasons. Not much turns on this,
though, for this article.
24 Cécile Fabre, Economic Statecraft: Human Rights, Sanctions, and Conditionality (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2018); Pattison, The Alternatives to War.
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deontological critique of war appears to be sometimes over-egged,
since the difference between doing and allowing harm is not absolute.
As such, even if wars do some harm, they can still sometimes be
permissible.25
This is where the Opportunity Costs Objection comes in. It adds a
fourth central reason in favour of pacifism that pacifists can draw
upon, in addition to the critique of war for (1) instrumental and (2)
deontological reasons, and (3) the reasons in favour of the alternative
measures to address the threat at hand. It concerns the reasons to
address (4) other threats. This might be thought to take us to pacifism,
even in cases such as the First Gulf War and Kosovo. Some might
hold that the Opportunity Costs Objection is, on its own, sufficient to
lead to pacifism. This would be a pure form of Opportunity Costs
Pacifism. Yet it seems more plausible that the Opportunity Costs
Objection plays a central role in tipping the balance in favour of
pacifism, together with the other three central reasons. This is a
more mixed form of pacifism, but it can still be viewed as Oppor-
tunity Costs Pacifism given the central role played by opportunity
costs.
III. OPPORTUNITY COSTS AND JUST WAR THEORY
Having outlined Opportunity Costs Pacifism, let’s now consider how
opportunity costs have been viewed in relation to the ethics of war.
As noted at the start, Just War Theorists have largely overlooked
opportunity costs, with their predominant focus on the permissibility
of responding to one particular threat, but some philosophers have
recently highlighted that Just War Theory should take seriously
opportunity costs. It is worth considering these claims because, on
the one hand, they repudiate some potential replies to the Oppor-
tunity Costs Objection. On the other, they appear to underestimate
the seriousness of the Opportunity Costs Objection and examining
why highlights a further reason in favour of Opportunity Costs
Pacifism.
In his brief discussion of the issue, Victor Tadros argues that the
possibility of using the war chest to fulfil humanitarian duties
25 Bazargan, ‘Varieties of Contingent Pacifism in War’; Jeff McMahan, ‘Pacifism and Moral Theory’,
Diametros 23 (2010): pp. 3–20.
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provides a powerful reason to think that it is typically wrong to engage in humanitarian wars.
The state should rather spend its resources preventing and curing illness and disease, for
example by providing mosquito nets, clean water or access to essential medicines. Doing these
things saves a great number of people from death and serious illness, killing almost no one.26
For Tadros, humanitarian intervention can be wrongful on an
‘internal’ basis, when others have legitimate claims on the resources
used to pursue them, in addition to external reasons why
intervention might be wrongful, such as the potential for them to
harm civilians.
In a similar vein, Kieran Oberman argues that ‘‘since states that
wage war could alleviate poverty instead, poverty can render war
unjust’’.27 According to Oberman, this is when, first, war would be
disproportionate because of its opportunity costs. Second, Oberman
argues that opportunity costs can render war wrongful when there is
a better means of achieving the same end – the ‘just ends’ of war (I
will consider this further below). In large part, Oberman focuses on
the issue of whether poverty can make wars of humanitarian
intervention impermissible, but also notes that this reasoning might
apply to other causes, such as climate change and wars of self-
defence.
One response to this claim is that humanitarian intervention is
permissible because it tackles intentional killing, whereas poverty is
largely unintentional. However, as Peter Singer helpfully argues,
there are not adequate grounds for giving priority to tackling
genocide (through war) rather than tackling other poverty-related
deaths.28 This is because, even if tackling intentional harm is more
important than tackling unintentional harm, it is not so much more
important that it justifies saving far fewer lives. For Singer, ‘‘if, given
our available resources, we could save the lives of many more vic-
tims of poverty than we could save, if instead we attempted to save
the lives of victims of genocide, we should save the victims of
poverty’’.29 In his (again) brief account of the issue, Jeff McMahan
agrees that intentional violations are not far worse.30 McMahan goes
on to argue that, rather than overlooking opportunity costs in Just
26 Tadros, ‘Unjust Wars Worth Fighting For’, pp. 73–74.
27 Oberman, ‘War and Poverty’, p. 197.
28 Peter Singer, ‘Bystanders to Poverty’, in N. Ann Davis, Richard Keshen, and Jeff McMahan (eds.),
Ethics and Humanity: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Glover (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010), pp. 185–201.
29 Singer, ‘Bystanders to Poverty’, p. 197.
30 McMahan, ‘Proportionate Defense’, pp. 2–6.
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War Theory, there should be, in fact, a new opportunity costs
principle of Just War Theory.
Although these accounts are helpful in showing why opportunity
costs should be taken seriously by Just War Theory, they do not fully
consider whether the opportunity costs of war are so serious that
they undercut the possibility of just war and lead to Opportunity
Costs Pacifism. (Indeed, as I consider further below, Oberman argues
that opportunity costs do not take us to pacifism.) One reason why
this appears to be the case concerns the ways that opportunity costs
are conceived in relation to Just War Theory in these accounts. That
is, they appear to underplay the significance of the measures used in
response to tackle other threats.
To explicate, we need to distinguish between two types of con-
sideration, which I mentioned briefly above. The first are threat-
specific considerations. These concern the morally relevant features of
the threat. Although space precludes providing a detailed account of
these, they concern features that are widely thought as relevant in
related fields, such as in how to prioritise limited resources in
healthcare.31 Leading threat-specific considerations include the size
of the threat in terms of the number of individuals affected, the
magnitude of the threat to the individuals (e.g. if it concerns their
right to life or relatively minor rights), the probability of the threat
materialising, and the culpability of those threatened.
The second are measure-specific considerations. These concern the
morally relevant features of the measures that will be used to address
the threat, such as whether a measure will be non-coercive. Again,
space precludes a detailed account here of these considerations, but
they concern features that are widely seen as relevant in the
assessment of measures used to address threats, such as of war and
its alternatives. Leading measure-specific considerations include the
efficacy of the measure at addressing the situation at hand, the
broader consequences of the measure, whether the measure receives
31 Dan W. Brock and Daniel Wikler, ‘Ethical Issues in Resource Allocation, Research, and New
Product Development’, in Dean T. Jamison, Joel G. Breman, Anthony R. Measham, George Alleyne,
Mariam Claeson, David B. Evans, Prabhat Jha, Anne Mills, and Philip Musgrove (eds.), Disease Control
Priorities in Developing Countries, Second Edition (Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.
259–270; John Harris, ‘Deciding Between Patients’, in Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer (eds.), A Companion
to Bioethics, Second Edition (London: Blackwell, 2017), pp. 335–350; Govind Persad, Alan Wertheimer,
and Ezekiel J. Emanuel, ‘Principles for Allocation of Scarce Medical Interventions’, The Lancet 373
(2009): pp. 423–431.
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the consent of the intended beneficiary, how the measure will dis-
tribute costs, whether the measure does harm, and if so whether the
measure’s harm will be mediated by another’s intervening agency.32
Accounts of opportunity costs in the above accounts focus largely
on the threat-specific considerations. They do not sufficiently
appreciate the measure-specific ones. Both are central. To see this,
consider the following scenario.
Ground Operation: France could reduce the threat posed by a terrorist group to itself by initiating
an extensive ground operation in Burkina Faso. Such an operation would use significant political
and economic resources and be likely to harm several innocent civilians. It could, however, use
these political and economic resources instead to offer a large financial inducement to the parties
involved in mass atrocities in South Sudan. This would incentivise them to stop their killing and
lead to a negotiated settlement. Given budgetary and political constraints, it is possible for
France to undertake only one measure.
In this example, it is not enough to look to the threat-specific
considerations to decide which course of action France should adopt.
The threat-specific considerations concern whether a terrorist threat
to France from inside Burkina Faso or mass atrocities in South Sudan
should be the priority. In addition, France needs to look to the
measure-specific considerations. These concern the measures that
would be used to address the threats in Burkina Faso and South
Sudan. These might appear to point in favour of tackling the situa-
tion in South Sudan, given that the inducements would be less
harmful, more effective, and less costly than military action.
As such, the measures used – the alternatives to war – are central
to assessing opportunity costs. The case for focusing, for instance, on
communicable and non-communicable disease is significantly
strengthened by the means that will be used to address these threats.
As noted above, health interventions are typically far less coercive
and more effective than military actions.33 This is in addition to the
far greater seriousness of the threat posed by communicable and
non-communicable disease.
32 These considerations are found widely in accounts of assessments of the ethics of war and of non-
military measures, such as sanctions and diplomacy. See, for instance, Cécile Fabre, Cosmopolitan War
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Fabre, Economic Statecraft, and Pattison, The Alternatives to War.
33 I focus on health interventions in general here, rather than responses to global pandemics. As the
global response to COVID-19 demonstrates, health interventions can sometimes be very coercive.
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The centrality of the alternatives to war to the assessment of
opportunity costs has not hitherto been fully appreciated in the
handful of discussions of opportunity costs in Just War Theory. Part
of the reason it seems is that it is, on the face of it, unclear how
opportunity costs should fit within Just War Theory. They appear to
be most clearly associated with the principles of proportionality and
necessity, which concern the costs of war and alternative courses of
action.34 Suppose that one sees them as a matter of proportionality.
Opportunity costs could render war as disproportionate because war
uses resources that should be spent elsewhere. However, propor-
tionality is widely understood as the case for performing an action
compared to inaction – i.e. compared to not waging war against the
terrorist group in Burkina Faso – rather than how the action compares
to performing other actions – i.e. to offering incentives to those in-
volved in mass atrocities in South Sudan.35 It is unclear how
opportunity costs can then be included into proportionality.
Suppose instead that one sees opportunity costs as a matter of
necessity. Necessity, as understood in recent accounts of Just War,
compares the case for performing an action to other actions that
could be used to redress the threat at hand. Necessity is sometimes
used as a synonym for last resort, which also requires a comparison
of war to other measures. On Seth Lazar’s leading account of
necessity, ‘‘[w]here an option O aims to avert a threat T, we deter-
mine O’s necessity by comparing it with all the other options that
will either mitigate or avert T’’.36 However, the problem is that
necessity, as understood here, concerns the measures that will ad-
dress a specific threat, ‘T’, such as mass atrocities. It does not compare
measures that will be used to address other threats. This is exactly
what is called for with opportunity costs. For instance, Ground
Operation concerns the tackling of different situations – either
reducing the terrorist threat facing France or helping to address mass
atrocities in South Sudan. The decision facing France is not choosing
the best means of addressing one specific threat, but rather choosing
34 Tadros (2011: 338–345) sees them as part of proportionality; McMahan (2013–2014: 2–6) defends
the need for a new principle; Oberman, ‘War and Poverty’, argues that they are part of both necessity
and proportionality.
35 See, for instance, McMahan, ‘Proportionate Defense’, p. 3.
36 Seth Lazar, ‘War’, in Edward Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2017
Edition. Available at <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/war/>. Also see Seth
Lazar, ‘Necessity in Self-Defense and War’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 40 (2012): pp. 3–44.
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the best response to multiple threats to different sets of individuals –
those under terrorist threat in France compared to those facing mass
atrocities in South Sudan. This choice cannot therefore be easily
captured by the principle of necessity, at least as it is commonly
understood.
Given the problems of relying on necessity or proportionality, we
could instead look to a new principle of opportunity costs, as
McMahan proposes.37 This would concern which threat should be
addressed. In Ground Operation, it would consider which situation is
the most pressing to tackle: the threat from the terrorist group in
Burkina Faso or mass atrocities in South Sudan? This might appear
to be the most straightforward option, especially when used prior to
the assessment of necessity.38 Here is how one might conceive the
decision-making. First, it is necessary to determine which is the most
serious situation. Suppose that in Ground Operation this is the threat
posed by the terrorist group in Burkina Faso. Second, it is necessary
to determine the best measure to tackle the terrorist group, such as
whether there should be economic sanctions, drone strikes, or a
ground invasion. Let’s suppose that the best measure is indeed a
ground operation in Burkina Faso, which is most likely to be suc-
cessful and will ultimately cause the least amount of harm to
innocent individuals.
The problem, though, is that such sequential decision-making
makes a crucial error. It misses comparing measures across multiple
threats. The case for tackling the threat cannot be so clearly sepa-
rated from the measures used to tackle it. In Ground Operation, the
collateral damage to innocents should be factored into the decision
about which threat to pursue. It may be that, once we include this, it
is preferable to tackle mass atrocities in South Sudan rather than to
engage in a ground operation in Burkina Faso, given that the positive
incentives would be non-coercive. Analogously, when we are con-
sidering where to go on holiday, we do not simply consider where
we want to go and then decide the best way of getting there. We
consider the difficulty of getting there alongside where we go. If we
are travelling with young children, this may mean that, if based in
37 McMahan, ‘Proportionate Defense’, pp. 2–6.
38 To be sure, an additional opportunity costs principle, such as that proposed by McMahan, could
run concurrently (i.e. alongside necessity and proportionality). (McMahan does not delineate how he
sees his principle working). I focus on an opportunity costs principle that is used prior to necessity.
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Europe, we choose to go to the Algarve, given the short flying time,
rather than the more idyllic Maldives. Thus, it is vital to consider the
case for various measures to tackle different threats. This cannot be
captured straightforwardly by adding an opportunity costs principle
that is prior to necessity and proportionality. We can grasp cases
such as Ground Operation only when we assess, concurrently, both
forms of consideration – threat-specific considerations and measure-
specific considerations. We need to know which threat should be
addressed alongside which measures should be used in response to
which threat.
How then should we understand opportunity costs in relation to
Just War Theory? I suggest that we use the notion of ‘holistic
necessity’. Holistic necessity requires the (concurrent) comparison of
war both to other measures to address the threat in question and to
other measures to address other threats. Holistic necessity therefore
differs from necessity, as it is commonly understood in recent Just
War Theory and the morality of self-defence, which we can call
‘discrete necessity’. Discrete necessity compares the measure in
question only to other measures in response to a single threat, such as
war to address aggression to economic sanctions to address aggres-
sion.39 This is akin to the principle of necessity ad bellum or, on some
formulations, last resort. Accordingly, holistic necessity includes both
the (1) threat-specific considerations and (2) measure-specific con-
siderations, whereas discrete necessity considers only (2) measure-
specific considerations.40
To summarise: the (largely brief) prevailing accounts of oppor-
tunity costs often focus on the threat-specific considerations. These
39 This is similar to the distinction drawn by Oberman between the ‘standard’ and ‘revisionary’ view
of necessity. Kieran Oberman, ‘Killing and Rescuing: The Case for Revising Necessity’, Philosophical
Review, forthcoming.
40 Holistic necessity might be thought to extend the concept of necessity too far. This is if necessity
is seen as concerning whether the costs of a measure are necessary, so, for instance, a measure (such as
war) will meet the necessity condition if it is the least harmful potential measure. Although I cannot
consider this point further here, this strikes me as a too restrictive understanding of necessity. What
necessity ultimately captures is the importance of comparing war to the alternatives. The costs of the
various measures are an important issue in this assessment, but there are other considerations – i.e.
other measure-specific considerations – including whether the other measures will save more lives, how
the measures will fare according to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, and the fairness of the
distribution of any costs and benefits. In my defence of holistic necessity, I have argued that this
comparative assessment should reflect both measure-specific and threat-specific considerations. (I frame
this in terms of necessity because this is the principle that is usually used to cover such comparative
assessments.) Notwithstanding, if one wants to adopt a narrow view of necessity (e.g. limiting it only to
costs), then another term rather than holistic necessity may be preferable, such as ‘holistic comparative
assessment’. Not much of substance turns on this.
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do provide some reason to take opportunity costs seriously. How-
ever, they largely overlook the measure-specific considerations re-
lated to the tackling of other threats. This seems to make it even
harder for war to be permissible. This is because not only is there a
lot more going for the alternatives to war to address the threat in
question, there is also a lot more going for other measures to address
other threats. This is what the notion of holistic necessity captures.
This brings us to the crux: in addition to the four reasons in
favour of pacifism noted in the previous section, there is a fifth. That
is, there are (1) instrumental and (2) deontological criticisms of war,
(3) positive reasons in favour of the other measures to address the
threat at hand (which is the typical focus of necessity or last resort),
and (4) reasons to address other threats. In addition, there are (5)
positive reasons in favour of the other measures to address other
threats. This helps to explain further why the Opportunity Costs
Objection might appear to take us to Opportunity Costs Pacifism.
IV. RESPONSES
Let’s now consider replies to Opportunity Costs Pacifism. I will start
with three replies that are largely unsuccessful, before considering a
more plausible response in the next section.
Response 1: Deterrence
The first response is that Opportunity Costs Pacifism is mistaken
because there needs to be a large military presence in order to deter
aggressors from launching an attack (when Opportunity Costs
Pacifism is not internalised by all states). If there are no armies, or
only weak ones, those who are currently in possession of weapons
(or those who can obtain weapons), would be able to launch
aggressive wars successfully when they choose. Moreover, the
objection continues, without a robust, military response to aggres-
sion, aggression will appear to be condoned or tolerated, and this
will encourage other states to engage in aggression in the future.
Thus, Opportunity Costs Pacifism leaves one vulnerable to aggres-
sors.41
41 Finlay, Is Just War Possible?, pp. 62–63.
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In reply, there are other robust responses to aggression that deter
and that do not involve engaging in military force. These include
economic sanctions, criminal prosecutions, and diplomatic sanctions,
such as naming and shaming and expulsion from international
bodies. Such measures can impose significant costs on aggressors and
make it clear that aggression is not tolerated or condoned. In addi-
tion, even without engaging in military force against aggressors,
there can still be the threat of military force. It is important here to
separate the issues of (1) the permissibility of waging war and (2) the
justifiability of military spending. The Opportunity Costs Objection,
and Opportunity Costs Pacifism in turn, are focused on the former.
In regard to the latter, some military spending might still be justified
on Opportunity Costs Pacifism, in order to provide a threat to deter
internal and external aggressors.42 It is worth noting that, to sustain
this threat, there need not necessarily be large standing armies. States
might, for instance, have small, well-trained armies, with collective
security arrangements with other states, or possess weapons of mass
destruction. Thus, Opportunity Costs Pacifism does not necessarily
require disarmament; it focuses on the resources used for (2) wars,
rather than for (1) maintaining the military more generally, which may
still be required. Notwithstanding, it seems likely that states spend
far beyond that which is necessary to deter aggressors.43
Response 2: Duties to Citizens
The second response to Opportunity Costs Pacifism holds that states
are permitted – and indeed obliged – to wage wars even when they
are suboptimal. This is (1) because of states’ fiduciary duties to
promote their citizens’ interests and (2) because citizens are free to
support suboptimal wars and states are duty-bound to represent their
citizens’ opinions.
42 For the deterrent threat to work, states might be required to bluff, that is, give the impression of
being willing to go to war.
43 It is also possible that agreements made between states might provide further reason in favour of
war, such as when states make collective security arrangements. However, it seems unlikely that such
agreements undermine the case for Opportunity Costs Pacifism, although space precludes considering
this fully here. This is because the importance of upholding such agreements seems likely to be
outweighed by the opportunity costs of war. That is, it would seem preferable for a state to break an
agreement and save many more lives by avoiding war, than to uphold it and launch a severely
suboptimal war.
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First, let’s consider the claim that states have very weighty fidu-
ciary duties to promote their citizens’ interests. It follows, on this
view, that wars of self-defence can be permissible (and indeed re-
quired), even if there are sizeable opportunity costs for noncitizens,
given that the duty of the state is first and foremost to look after its
own citizens. How plausible one finds this claim will depend, in part,
on one’s views on the broader debate between cosmopolitans and
statists about the strength of duties to fellow nationals vis-à-vis
cosmopolitan duties.44 Although I cannot defend it at length here,
my view is that there are weighty positive duties to noncitizens. On
this view, this response to Opportunity Costs Pacifism fails since
states are not permitted (or required) to give significant priority to
their citizens by waging significantly suboptimal wars of self-defence.
But let’s suppose that I am mistaken and that states’ positive obli-
gations to those beyond their borders are minimal. I want to now
argue that, even then, Opportunity Costs Pacifism seems plausible.
This is for three reasons.
First, wars raise domestic opportunity costs, in addition to the
international opportunity costs that I have focused on thus far. Many
of the resources that states use to fight wars could be otherwise
spent domestically. They could help to tackle domestic poverty and
preventable deaths.45 For instance, the several trillion dollars spent
on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan could have been spent on
providing adequate healthcare coverage in the U.S., which could
have saved thousands of lives – and seemingly saved far more U.S.
citizens than were at risk from the threats posed by Saddam Hus-
sein’s Iraq and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. For instance, a
leading study finds that as many as 44,000 people die in the U.S. per
year due to a lack of health insurance, which is far more than were
perceived to be at serious risk on an even expansive notion of the
threat posed by Iraq and the Taliban.46 Accordingly, even if there are
44 See, for instance, Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005); Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice; Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global
Justice’; Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, Second Edition (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2008).
45 Oberman, ‘War and Poverty’, p. 203.
46 Andrew P. Wilper, Steffie Woolhandler, Karen E. Lasser, Danny McCormick, David H. Bor, and
David U. Himmelstein, ‘Health Insurance and Mortality in US Adults’, American Journal of Public Health
99 (2009): pp. 2289–2295.
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very weighty fiduciary obligations, war appears likely to be highly
suboptimal given potential domestic opportunity costs.
Second, as noted above, the Opportunity Costs Objection con-
cerns not only positive duties to assist, but also negative duties not to
harm, and war will almost always transgress negative duties not to
harm. Most notably, it will typically do significant harm to (innocent)
non-citizens. Although the positive duties of the state to citizens
might outweigh positive duties to assist noncitizens, negative duties
not to harm are widely viewed as very weighty, regardless of the
nationality of the right-holder. At the individual level, strong positive
associative duties do not seem to provide licence to significantly
transgress negative duties. For instance, it seems that a father could
not permissibly kill two other innocent children in order to protect
his own child, despite the very weighty positive obligations of
fatherhood.47 In a similar vein, it seems that a state could not per-
missibly harm several innocent civilians in another state in order to
promote the basic interests of a few of its citizens. To see this,
suppose that launching a bombing campaign against a terrorist threat
abroad would decrease the risks to a few citizens, but would be likely
to harm numerous civilians collaterally in the target state. It would
seem problematic to launch the campaign, given its harming of
noncitizens. Indeed, the leading accounts of proportionality by Adil
Haque and Jeff McMahan reject the notion that national partiality
justifies the deaths of a much greater number of foreign civilians.48
Part of the reason given by Haque and McMahan is that national
partiality does not outweigh doing harm to foreign civilians by means
of war, when there is the option of doing nothing.49 A similar logic
applies to opportunity costs: fiduciary duties do not outweigh the
wrongness of doing harm to more noncitizens by means of war,
when there is the option of measures that would do less harm in
tackling other threats.
Third, wars will also typically transgress negative duties not to
harm the state’s own citizens; in short, wars do harm to citizens. Most
clearly, wars may sometimes involve conscription. But even if based
47 Alec D. Walen, The Mechanics of Claims and Permissible Killing in War (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2019), pp. 78–79.
48 Adil Ahmad Haque, Law and Morality at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Jeff
McMahan, ‘The Just Distribution of Harm between Combatants and Noncombatants’, Philosophy &
Public Affairs 38 (2010): pp. 342–379.
49 Haque, Law and Morality at War, pp. 13–14; McMahan, ‘The Just Distribution of Harm’, p. 377.
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on an all-volunteer force, wars will often involve soldiers bearing
significant harms, who have been misled into joining the armed
forces by recruiters.50 Wars will also often harm the family and
friends of those sent to war when those sent to war are injured or
psychologically traumatised by war, as well as damage significantly
the basic infrastructure of the state.
To overcome these three points, the benefits to citizens would
have to be large enough to overcome the domestic opportunity costs
and outweigh the wrongness of doing harm to both noncitizens and
citizens. A war would, for instance, need to prevent the violation of
basic rights of a much greater number of citizens than the number of
noncitizens and citizens that it harms, and be the optimal way to
promote citizens’ rights. Even if certain wars in the past might have
met this threshold, it seems highly unlikely that currently, or in the
near future, a war would do so. This is, in part, because it is doubtful
whether states will face a significant enough threat from aggressors
beyond their borders, which could require a major war of self-de-
fence. Important here is that there has been a substantial decline in
interstate aggression over the past 50 years.51 There are unlikely to
be state aggressors waging large-scale offensives. As a result, it does
not appear to be likely that states will face a sizable, existential threat
to wage a war of self-defence.
Let’s now turn to the second response. Can the wishes of citizens
mean that states can permissibly wage suboptimal wars of self-de-
fence? To start with, it is worth noting that citizens often oppose
war, particularly in the wake of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.52
This calls into question whether the demos is in fact likely to support
50 For instance, the US Army has allegedly misled student recruits and to have targeted children in a
manner akin to ‘predatory grooming’. Amy Hagopian and Kathy Barker, ‘Should We End Military
Recruiting in High Schools as a Matter of Child Protection and Public Health?’ American Journal of Public
Health 101 (2011): pp. 19–23; Lawrence Korb and Sean Duggan, ‘An All-Volunteer Army? Recruitment
and its Problems’, Political Science & Politics 40 (2007): pp. 467–471.
51 For an overview of the literature on the decline of war, see Nils Petter Gleditsch, ‘The Decline of
War – The Main Issues’, International Studies Review 15 (2013): pp. 397–399. Recall here that I focus on
international conflicts; states might still face internal threats, such as those posed by rebel groups (levels
of intrastate conflict have not experienced such a degree of decline).
52 For instance, although public opinion on warfare can vary, a recent YouGov survey suggests that
the majority of populations in Western states, including the U.S., France, and U.K., oppose foreign
interventions. YouGov, ‘Eurotrack: Corbyn’s Policies Popular in Europe and UK’, 2019. Available at
<https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/01/09/eurotrack-corbyns-policies-
popular-europe-and-uk>. The public support for war, even if it is successful, decreases as they become
aware of diplomatic alternatives. Aaron M. Hoffman, Christopher R. Agnew, Laura E. VanderDrift, and
Robert Kulzick, ‘Norms, Diplomatic Alternatives, and the Social Psychology of War Support’, Journal of
Conflict Resolution 59 (2013): pp. 3–28.
JAMES PATTISON566
foreign wars (to be sure, citizens are also often sceptical about using
the resources elsewhere, such as for humanitarian assistance, pre-
ferring spending on domestic causes).53
More fundamentally, it seems doubtful that support from the
demos for war should be viewed as a weighty factor when consid-
ering whether to go to war. To be sure, if the demos opposes war,
this is a notable (if not necessarily insurmountable) constraint on
waging war. This is because citizens will often have to bear the
burdens of the war, such as increased taxation and casualties
amongst friends and family in the armed forces.54 However, when
the demos is in favour of war, this does not seem to be an important
consideration. That is to say, citizen support is best seen as a negative
constraint against launching a war rather than a positive reason in
favour of launching a war. This is because wars, again, tend to do
harm. The positive reasons in favour of respecting democratic
wishes of the population do not seem to outweigh the stringent
negative duties not to harm citizens and noncitizens. Indeed, at the
domestic level, it seems uncontroversial that majority support from
the demos does not permit a state to engage in rights violations of a
minority. Similarly, at the international level, majority support for
war does not seem to be sufficient to permit the state to engage in
the transgression of the rights of those beyond the borders of the
state (as well as of some of those within it).
It is worth considering one further point here. It might be thought
that states are permitted to fight suboptimal wars if they so choose.
The reasoning draws on the domestic analogy: just as individuals
should be free to choose which good ends to pursue as long as they
make a reasonable effort to tackle injustice, so should states be free
to choose which good ends to pursue, as long as they make a rea-
sonable effort to tackle injustice. We can now see why this analogy is
mistaken. It is not simply because, as effective altruists argue, the
first premise is wrong: individuals are not, in fact, free to choose
which good ends they pursue – they should pursue optimal policies
53 For instance, the U.S. public tends to be sceptical of aid, with the majority believing that it gives
too much. Reuben Hurst, Taylor Tidwell, and Darren Hawkins, ‘Down the Rathole? Public Support for
US Foreign Aid’, International Studies Quarterly 61 (2017): pp. 442–454.
54 See, further, James Pattison, ‘Representativeness and Humanitarian Intervention’, Journal of Social
Philosophy 38 (2017): pp. 569–587. Of course, citizens may also oppose launching other options, such as
economic sanctions because they will have to bear very significant burdens. This might count against
launching such measures, although not necessarily in favour of war (doing nothing may be the preferred
option).
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(when they can do so at no additional cost).55 It is also because, even
if one denies effective altruism, it still seems clear that states are not
free to choose which ends they pursue and how they do so. Most
obviously, leaders of states cannot act on a whim. They are, at the
very least, significantly constrained by their responsibilities to their
citizens; they have responsibilities to consider the costs of a policy for
citizens and to respect the wishes of the demos to an extent.56 Even
if the costs to citizens are very low, or if a measure is supported by
the demos, states are also constrained by their responsibilities not to
harm noncitizens (as well as the positive duties towards noncitizens).
These constraints mean that the leaders of state are not free to
choose, on a whim, to wage a suboptimal war.57
Response 3: Specific Aims of War
A third response to Opportunity Costs Pacifism concerns the aims of
war. First, it might be thought that there are some values that only
war can defend. These might be thought to include, for instance,
deterring aggression, securing territory, or upholding political inde-
pendence, and, in general, civil and political rights. One obvious
problem with this response is that these values can sometimes be
protected by other measures, such as economic sanctions, nonvio-
lent action, or diplomatic action. Another version of the response
holds that war better defends these values, whereas the other options
are more suited to defend other values – especially socio-economic
rights – such as tackling unnecessary deaths from global poverty. But
this seems empirically dubious. Other measures can often be far
55 MacAskill, Doing Good Better; Theron Pummer, ‘Whether and Where to Give’, Philosophy & Public
Affairs 44 (2016): pp. 77–95; Peter Singer, The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing
Ideas About Living Ethically (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015). To be sure, effective altruism
could still permit space for individuals to pursue their own projects. The key point is that, when
individuals are pursuing good ends, they should pursue optimal ones (other things being equal). In
other words, they should do the most good that they can do when they are doing good (other things
being equal), but still might have space not to have to do good all the time.
56 On this issue, see further Kieran Oberman, ‘The Myth of Optional War: Why States are Required
to Wage the Wars They Are Permitted to Wage’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 43 (2015): pp. 255–286.
Oberman argues that there cannot be supererogatory wars.
57 To be sure, a war could, conceivably, not raise significant domestic opportunity costs and not
transgress significantly negative duties not to harm citizens and noncitizens. However, such cases are
likely to be rare, given that wars do tend to transgress significantly negative duties and raise domestic
opportunity cases. Moreover, in such cases, the positive duties that I have bracketed would be relevant
and would be likely to tip the balance in favour of Opportunity Cost Pacifism. That is, states would not
be permitted (or required) to give significant priority to their citizens by waging hugely suboptimal wars
of self-defence.
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more effective at defending these values, such as civil and political
rights, than war is. Perhaps most clearly, war is a notoriously
problematic measure to install democracy, which may be far better
secured by supporting local movements non-violently.58 In addition,
even when war will protect civil and political rights, it seems likely
that the other options are typically likely to benefit (1) many more
individuals (2) in greater ways in terms of socio-economic rights.
That is, the number of individuals affected and the magnitude of the
benefit to them are likely to be far higher. For instance, the aggre-
gate benefits that accrue to individuals from tackling global poverty,
such as access to healthcare, education, shelter, food, and medicine,
would be likely to be greater than for war, in terms of the number of
individuals benefitted and the size of benefit for each. War might,
perhaps, provide aggregate benefits that accrue from protecting
political independence or securing territory, but these seem likely to
benefit fewer individuals (such as when defending the territory of a
particular region) or be comparatively less significant (such as when
upholding political independence).59
It might be replied here that Opportunity Costs Pacifism, as I
have framed it, is premised upon a highly individualistic account of
value. It is focused on the opportunity costs for individuals, for
instance, of tackling communicable and noncommunicable diseases.
In doing so, it overlooks collective values, such as self-determination.
War might be thought justified in protecting such collective values.
However, the most plausible accounts of collective values ultimately
hold that such values are reducible to their value to individuals.60
When this is the case, it seems clear that they can be outweighed by
58 See Erica Chenoworth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of
Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). Chenoworth and Stephan find that
nonviolent movements in general are far more likely to succeed than violent ones.
59 To be sure, I am not claiming that these values will always be better protected by these other
methods. As such, there may be exceptions when war better promotes these values. But such excep-
tions seem likely to be rare and, even when they do apply, war is likely to do poorly according to other
concerns, such as the import of avoiding doing harm or reducing overall harm. Again, it’s important to
reiterate here that Opportunity Costs Pacifism is a form of contingent pacifism. Thus, even if there are
conceivable exceptions where war not only better promotes these other values and where it does less
harm and leads to fewer overall deaths, what matters is whether this is currently feasible. This seems
highly unlikely.
60 For example, Moore, who offers the leading account of the values of territory and self-deter-
mination, powerfully defends the individual interest in these values. Margaret Moore, A Political Theory
of Territory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). Moore also emphasises that these values are not
absolute; they are constrained by individual human rights. Margaret Moore, ‘Reply to Critics’, Critical
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 21 (2018): pp. 806–817.
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the greater value to individuals derived from tackling other threats.
For instance, the individual value in self-determination is likely to be
outweighed by the individual value in being free from unnecessary
disease. Even if one does not accept this, there is, again, a more
straightforward response. Many of the collective values defended by
war are under greater threat from disease and other forms of vio-
lence, such as domestic violence against women. For instance, the
huge burden of disease can make it extremely difficult for a com-
munity to be collectively self-determining, at least in a meaningful
sense. It will not enjoy the freedom from want necessary for the
community to be able to self-determine.
There is also a different argument about the ends of war. This
comes from Oberman, who argues that the opportunity costs of war
and poverty ‘‘take us a step towards pacifism, making war much
harder to justify. They do not, however, take us all the way’’.61 This
is because Oberman sees necessity/last resort as comparing effects
limited by the potential ‘just ends of war’. When the opportunity
costs concern what could be the just ends of war, such as tackling a
humanitarian disaster, then war can be unnecessary. However, for
Oberman, war can still be necessary when it is the best option to
achieve the ‘just ends of war’, such as defence against an invasion,
and the opportunity costs do not concern the just ends of war,
perhaps such as health or education.62
However, it is unclear why exactly for Oberman opportunity
costs do not take us to pacifism – or, at least, tip the balance in
favour of pacifism when combined with the other reasons in favour
of it.63 First, it seems to confuse matters to refer to the ‘just ends of
war’ in this context. As argued above, we need a broader account of
necessity – holistic necessity – that is not limited to considering
whether the measure should be launched to tackle the threat in
question; it should also include considering whether other threats
should be tackled. Crucially, these other threats should not be lim-
61 Oberman, ‘War and Poverty’, p. 215.
62 In addition to this argument about necessity, Oberman argues that opportunity costs can render
war disproportionate. I argued above, though, that seeing opportunity costs as a matter of propor-
tionality does not capture what is at stake, since proportionality compares to inaction (i.e. not launching
the measure), rather than comparing to tackling other threats.
63 To be sure, Oberman generally focuses on tackling poverty as an opportunity cost. It is unclear
whether he would hold that other opportunity costs, such as tackling climate change, would in fact take
as all the way to pacifism.
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ited to only the ‘just ends of war’. Rather, they should include threats
that are not widely thought to be a just end of war, such as health
and education. To see this, suppose that a state faces the choice
whether to (1) launch a war to tackle a terrorist threat or (2) to use
these resources to improve education in less developed countries,
which will have the effect of educating thousands of underprivileged
children. It still seems that the state should take seriously the fact
that war would use resources that would preclude education. The
comparison made should therefore not be limited to the ‘just ends of
war’.
Suppose, though, that one still wants to hold that the just ends of
war provide a limit on the threats that can be tackled, as Oberman
suggests. If we do so, it seems plausible that there should be a very
expansive list of ends. In principle, a war could pursue many goals,
from tackling poverty to saving the lives of non-human species.64
What’s more, if we adopt a broad account of the just ends of war,
there are also many just ends that can be pursued by other measures.
For instance, tackling poverty might be a just end of war. If so, it is
permissible to compare war to measures that tackle poverty, even if
the war in question has a different aim. Indeed, Oberman adopts a
very broad account of the just ends of war, including self-defence,
the prevention of mass atrocities, achieving basic well-being, and
potentially law enforcement and punishment. If so many other ends
can be justifiably pursued, it seems likely that war will often be
unnecessary, and so the objection to Opportunity Costs Pacifism
falters.65
V. WAR PERMISSIBLE NONIDEALLY
Having considered three responses to Opportunity Costs Pacifism
that are unpersuasive, I will now present a fourth. This does show
that it is sometimes permissible for states to go to war. However, it
still accepts that opportunity costs take us to pacifism. How can this
be coherent?
64 Alasdair Cochrane and Steve Cooke, ‘Humane Intervention: The International Protection of
Animal Rights’, Journal of Global Ethics 12 (2016): pp. 106–121; Fabre, Cosmopolitan War, pp. 97–128.
65 It might also be objected that it is not possible to compare fighting wars and tackling other threats
because they are incommensurable. But this seems mistaken. After all, we compare war to other
measures, such as economic sanctions, to address the threat at hand, under the principle of last resort
and necessity ad bellum. More generally, it seems plausible that war can be compared to other measures
by comparing (at least) the effect on basic interests. To that extent, there can be commensurability.
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Unfortunately, we can expect parliaments and populations often
not to be motivated by tackling many of the threats facing those
beyond their borders. They will often ignore opportunity costs that
arise when considering war. They will focus on tackling vivid,
spectacular threats, such as those posed by terrorism, with little
regard for the cost. Militarised responses are deeply ingrained, as has
been all too clear with the Global War on Terror. As such, popu-
lations and parliaments may not support action, for instance, to
tackle infectious disease over military action to tackle terrorist
threats or even mass atrocities. It seems highly unlikely, for example,
that the U.S. public and Congress more generally would have sup-
ported anything even close to the $5.9 trillion spent on the Global
War on Terror and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan being used instead
to eradicate global poverty and preventable disease in other states.
Governments and leaders may sometimes find these to be serious,
robust constraints. They will lack the domestic support necessary to
prioritise threats in the most ethical way and attempts may be
blocked. The only option that will not be blocked will be a military
response. What this means is that the real choice facing governments
will sometimes not be between, for instance, tackling mass atrocities
or infectious disease, but rather between tackling mass atrocities
through war and doing nothing. Another way of putting this is that
questions of opportunity costs sometimes do not arise because they
are not within the feasible option set of decision-makers.66
This leaves the door open for war to be permissible non-ideally.
The decision to go to war might still be permissible, given the good
that it will bring about, compared to the other feasible option (of
doing nothing). For instance, in the case of Libya, it seems highly
likely that the U.S. and U.K. publics and legislatures would have not
supported the resources used to intervene being used instead to
increase significantly the aid budget. The choice, it seems, was to act
or not, and, as such, the decision to intervene might still have been
permissible. In this sense, holistic necessity is not, in fact, a necessary
condition of jus ad bellum. Wars can be permissible even though
suboptimal.
66 By feasible option-set, I mean what is within the scope of leaders’ official powers. These powers
require them to have the approval of the legislature, for instance, for certain measures, and to be acting
legally. Political unpopularity does not render an option unfeasible. Thus, that some non-military
options are politically difficult would not be sufficient reason per se to go to war.
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In a somewhat similar vein, Tadros argues that ‘‘[i]t is often easier
to motivate people and states to support and engage in humanitarian
wars to prevent genocide, or other seriously wrongful acts, than it is
to motivate people to provide resources for other kinds of human-
itarian aid’’.67 Thus, he argues, we should not deter or condemn
humanitarian intervention, ‘‘even though it is wrong to engage in’’ it
since doing so will not get states to do what they should by spending
resources on other humanitarian projects.
My point goes further: sometimes governments do not act wrongly
in such cases since there is not the feasible option of using the
resources otherwise. The reason to condemn them is not for
instrumental reasons. Rather, it is because they simply have not done
anything that merits condemnation. They have acted rightly in the
circumstances. This is consistent with holding that the public and
others who maintain the constraints on decision-makers should be
condemned.
VI. BROADER IMPLICATIONS
This has major implications for Just War Theory and for pacifism. A
highly non-ideal morality of war is the only place where there can
really be the domain of Just War Theory. It is only at this extremely
non-ideal level that we can talk of morally permissible wars in
practice. At this level, there will be non-compliance not simply by
the aggressors that provide the just cause, but also severe non-
compliance by many of those in the responding state, which places
severe restrictions on policymakers in this state. Above this level,
Opportunity Costs Pacifism seems plausible, given the opportunity
costs involved with war.68
To elaborate, non-ideal theory (in the Rawlsian sense) concerns
circumstances where there is non-compliance with the ideal moral
principles and the existence of favourable circumstances in order to
realise the ideal (such as historical, economic, and social conditions).
Accounts of Just War Theory are all forms of non-ideal theory given
that they take into account non-compliance with the ideal moral
67 Tadros, ‘Unjust Wars Worth Fighting For’, p. 87.
68 To be sure, at the most idealised level of Just War Theory – a fully ‘deep’ morality of war – the
existence of favourable circumstances (apart from the presence of an aggressor that provides just cause)
would be fully assumed, including opportunity costs, and so war might still be justified. I focus here on
more practically focussed accounts.
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principles by aggressors, but vary in how much they reflect non-
compliance and unfavourable circumstances, with different degrees
of ‘ideality’. Roughly, traditionalists often offer more non-ideal ac-
counts; revisionists often offer more idealised accounts.69 My point
here is that the potential for wars to be permissible will concern only
cases where there are hugely unfavourable circumstances. This is
where decision-makers cannot tackle threats in a more peaceful
manner given domestic constraints. There is non-compliance by
those upholding the constraints, such as by parliamentarians and the
public (i.e. non-compliance with the requirement to tackle the most
serious threats in the most peaceful manner). Just War Theory is
plausible only when the decision-makers’ option set is circumscribed
in this way. This is far more non-ideal than prevailing accounts of
Just War Theory, both revisionist and traditionalist. Even the more
practical and non-ideal focused accounts do not reflect this sort of
non-compliance and unfavourable circumstance.
This is also important for pacifism – and not simply for Oppor-
tunity Costs Pacifism. The worry that leaders will not be able to
choose the best response also applies to the choice of means to tackle
a particular threat, that is, discrete necessity, which, as noted above,
is more commonly understood as last resort or necessity ad bellum.
Sometimes certain measures, such as offering positive incentives,
might be far more likely to be justified than military action, but face
significant domestic constraints, such as being unpopular domesti-
cally.70 Other measures, such as EU or UN economic sanctions or an
arms embargo, might fail to receive the international backing nec-
essary to be launched. As such, in addition to the fourth and fifth
reasons in favour of pacifism noted above, the third reason – that
there are alternatives that can better tackle the threat in question –
also fails to apply in hugely unfavourable circumstances. The choice,
in effect, is between doing nothing and launching military action in
response to the threat in question. The plausibility of pacifism in
large part depends on other threats or other measures being adopted.
69 James Pattison, ‘The Case for the Nonideal Morality of War: Beyond Revisionism versus Tra-
ditionalism in Just War Theory’, Political Theory 46 (2018): pp. 242–268.
70 Graeme A. M. Davies and Robert Johns, ‘The Domestic Consequences of International Over-
Cooperation: An Experimental Study of Microfoundations’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 33
(2016): pp. 343–360.
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If they are unlikely to be so, war can still be permissible sometimes.
Pacifism is far less appealing when the likely alternative is passivism.
VII. CONCLUSION
To conclude, I have argued that the opportunity costs of war appear
to lead to pacifism, specifically, Opportunity Costs Pacifism. At the
ideal level, Opportunity Costs Pacifism seems plausible. Wars are
unlikely to be permissible, once the Opportunity Costs Objection is
added to the other arguments against war. Notwithstanding, wars
can still be permissible in highly nonideal circumstances, when the
choices facing decision-makers are significantly constrained. The
upshot is that it is only at the highly nonideal level that war can be
justified and we can speak of just wars according to Just War Theory.
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